
Carried out among 1,028 adolescents, this study reveals a youth attached to consent and mixed friendships, but crossed by deep tensions on gender equality and sexual minorities.
Desire for a child: historical perspective, more assertive choices
In a context where the government is displaying a “plan against infertility” to boost the birth rate, the question can seem almost provocative: do today’s adolescents still want to become parents?
The answer is far from obvious. According to the survey conducted by Ifop for Elle, only 57% of young people aged 15 to 17 say they want to have children. Forty years ago, there were 77% at the same age.
© Ifop – Elle
The dropout is clear. And if there is a slight gap between the sexes – 61% of girls compared to 55% of boys – it is above all the relationship to feminism which widens the differences. Among young girls who say they are “very feminist”, 31% do not want to have children, almost three times more than among those who do not claim to be feminists (12%).
This decline in the desire to have children does not mean disenchantment with the family. Rather, it reflects a more reflexive relationship to parenthood, less dictated by social norms. The injunctions to motherhood, long internalized from adolescence, seem to lose their obviousness.
François Kraus, director of the “Politics/News” division of Ifop, analyzes: “The results of this survey highlight the effect of progressive discourses on a “Metoo generation” which rejects the injunctions to motherhood, heterosexuality or traditional or even patriarchal marital models much more than that of its parents at the same age.
Feminism, religion, LGBT: a widening “gender gap”
At first glance, the generation seems committed to equality: 61% of adolescents declare themselves feminists. But behind this overall figure lies a spectacular gap. Among girls, 77% say they are feminists. Among boys, they are only 45%. Less than one in two.
Concern about the defense of women’s rights follows the same dividing line: 69% of girls say they are concerned, compared to 45% of boys. More than one in two young people (57%) feel concerned, but the commitment is not symmetrical.
The weight of social environment and religious convictions appears decisive. Thus, 44% of religious believers believe that feminists “hate men”compared to 36% of atheists. More than one in two young religious believers (53%) consider that a married woman should take her husband’s name, compared to 26% of atheists.
Certain hierarchical representations persist: 31% of young Muslims believe that, for a relationship to work, the man must often make decisions, compared to 17% of Catholics and 8% of young people without religion.
LGBTphobic stereotypes are not absent either. 62% of young Muslims think that homosexuals should avoid showing their orientation in public spaces. Four in ten religious believers believe that homosexual couples should not be able to raise children, compared to 13% of atheists. Finally, 13% of adolescents believe that violence against homosexual people is sometimes understandable – a figure which rises to 23% among young Muslims.
In view of these figures, François Kraus notes “a very yawning gender divide between massively progressive young girls and clearly more conservative boys, a divide fueled by masculinist postures that are particularly prevalent in the most popular and/or most religious circles. In this survey, as in others, the return of religion observed among young people appears undeniably linked to a rejection of progressive discourse in favor of women or LGBT”.
Behind the percentages, a cultural battle is taking shape. A generation shaped by social networks, public debates, feminist mobilizations, but also by discourses of withdrawal and opposition.
Friendship, seduction, consent: a new relational grammar
And yet, the cohabitation of the sexes is nothing like a cold war. The vast majority of adolescents (90%) say they have at least one friend of the opposite sex. Otherness is experienced on a daily basis, in classes, groups of friends, activities.
However, the image of boys has evolved in the eyes of girls: they are perceived as less “cool” (-9 points), less nice (-7 points) and above all less romantic (-17 points) than twenty-five years ago. Negative qualifiers — “macho,” “aggressive,” “violent” — increased slightly, but remained relatively stable.
The #MeToo movement has left a lasting imprint. One in two young people believe that it has become more difficult to seduce since #MeToo. More boys think so (56%) than girls (44%). As if the redefinition of the codes of seduction, now more attentive to consent, had destabilized certain benchmarks.
© Elle Ifop
However, on one essential point, unanimity is almost total: 96% of adolescents consider that respecting consent is essential. Girls and boys overwhelmingly share this conviction.
Another paradox: 46% of young people believe that it is better to be a boy than a girl in today’s society – a figure lower than that of adults (65%), but revealing a persistent perception of inequalities. Interestingly, more girls than boys think it is better to be a boy (50% versus 42%).
A generation in tension, but in movement
This survey does not depict a uniformly progressive youth, nor a massive return to conservatism. It shows adolescents crossed by contradictory influences, caught between egalitarian aspirations and cultural heritage, between emancipation and withdrawal into identity.
They question parenthood, redefine seduction, affirm consent. But they also, sometimes, reproduce gender stereotypes or representations hostile to minorities.
Understanding these tensions means refusing caricatures. It means accepting that the “#MeToo generation” is not a homogeneous bloc, but a ground for intimate and political debates. At the age of first loves and first convictions, these adolescents are already building the society of tomorrow. Between doubts, impulses and fractures, they force us to face the fault lines that run through our time.